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Constitutional identity has recently emerged as a relevant concept in the theory of cons-
titutional law. It first appeared in constitutional decision reasoning in the second half of 
the 20th century, particularly in cases concerning the process of European integration. 
Constitutional courts all over Europe have started to use this notion as a legal counter-
argument against the growing influence of the European Court of Justice on the national 
legal systems of member states. At the theoretical level, the use of this new concept 
caused a lot of criticism by law scholars, due, in their opinion, to its non-legal unscientific 
character. At the same time, there are also many supporters of this concept, mainly the 
representatives of the civilizational and sociocultural approaches to law. One way or 
another, it is fair to say that this concept has captured the attention of constitutional 
lawyers who, nevertheless, have not come yet to a common understanding of this 
notion. Some of them suggest defining constitutional identity as a method of legal 
argumentation, but there are still no comprehensive studies of this concept using 
achievements of the theory of legal argumentation. This article represents an attempt 
to research the notion of “constitutional identity” through the prism of the latter.
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Introduction
For the last couple of decades the theory of legal argumentation has acquired the 
status of one of the most demanded directions of modern interdisciplinary research 
in the field of humanitarian knowledge. As noted in the literature, in recent years 
researchers from various fields of science, such as philosophy, logic, rhetoric, psychology, 
sociology, and others, have made numerous attempts “to explain structural features of 
legal decision-making and justification from different points of view.”1
At the same time, legal argumentation has become the subject of studies of legal 
theory itself only relatively recently. the questions existing within the framework of 
this topic have been actively developed by such well-known scholars in the field of 
philosophy and theory of law as A. Aarnio,2 G. tarello,3 A. Peczenik,4 d.N. MacCormick 
and r. summers5 and r. Alexy6 only in the late 1970s.
in russian scientific thought, the fundamental theoretical issues of legal argumen-
tation are some of the least developed and at the present stage of its elaboration 
continue to be the subject of study mainly of the sciences of logic and philology.
there are separate comprehensive studies of legal orientation, at the same 
time, a small number of russian publications are devoted to the problems of the 
theory of legal argumentation and, in the authors’ opinion, are multidirectional and 
unsystematic. it also seems fair to argue that russian researchers do not take into 
1  eveline Feteris & harm kloosterhuis, The Analysis and Evaluation of Legal Argumentation: Approaches 
from Legal Theory and Argumentation Theory, 16(29) studies in Logic, Grammar and rhetoric 307, 
307 (2009).
2  Aulis Aarnio, On Legal Reasoning (turku: university of turku Press, 1977).
3  Giovanni tarello, L’interpretazione della legge [The Interpretation of Laws] (Milan: Giuffrè, 1980).
4  Aleksander Peczenik, The Basis of Legal Justification (Lund: Lund university Press, 1983).
5  Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study (d.N. MacCormick & r.s. summers (eds.), Aldershot: dartmouth, 
1991).
6  robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as Theory of Legal 
Justification (N. MacCormick & r. Adler (trans.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
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account the achievements of foreign general legal theory. the last thesis is also fair 
with the reference to the studies made within different branches of law, which also 
take place in russian legal literature.
At the same time, modern understanding of legal constructions, especially those 
that appeared in legal theory and practice quite recently, requires, in the authors’ 
opinion, new methodological approaches to their study, both private-scientific (legal 
itself ) and general scientific (interdisciplinary).
the purpose of this article is to attempt to research the notion of “constitutional 
identity” that has appeared relatively recently in science and constitutional judicial 
law enforcement practice through the prism of the achievements of the theory of 
legal argumentation.
1. The Concept of Constitutional Identity  
in Constitutional Decision Reasoning
Before proceeding to the study of this concept from the standpoint of the theory 
of legal argumentation, it is necessary to refer to the history of the emergence and 
development of constitutional identity, as well as to identify approaches to its 
explanation currently existing in constitutional law.
“Constitutional identity” is a relatively new concept in legal doctrine7 and 
constitutional judicial practice. As noted in legal literature, from the doctrinal point 
of view, the concept of “identity” has been predominantly studied as a subject of 
social studies,8 and only recently began to attract the attention of legal scholars, 
mostly european and international law scholars and constitutionalists.
the reason for increased attention to this topic in jurisprudence was that the notion 
of “identity” appeared and began to be actively used by the european constitutional 
courts to justify decisions related to european integration process and the expanding 
influence of supranational institutions of international organizations, in particular 
the european union, on the domestic legal systems of member states.9
7  See Michel rosenfeld, Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives 
(durham: duke university Press, 1994); Gary J. Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity, 68(3) review of Politics 
361 (2006); National Constitutional Identity and European Integration (A. saiz Arnaiz & C. Alcoberro Llivina 
(eds.), Antwerp: intersentia, 2013).
8  For the list of works see Anna Śledzińska-simon, Constitutional Identity in 3D: A Model of Individual, 
Relational, and Collective Self and its Application in Poland, 13(1) international Journal of Constitutional 
Law 124 (2015). For example, in sociology, it is talked about individual and collective identity and even 
about identity of different societies and people. See Бланкенагель А. Призрак бродит по решениям 
европейских конституционных судов: что делать с конституционной идентичностью? // 
Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. 2018. № 5(126). С. 42–64 [Alexander Blankenagel, 
The Ghost Haunting Decisions of European Constitutional Courts: What to Do with Constitutional Identity?, 
5(126) Comparative Constitutional review 42 (2018)].
9  As noted in the literature, over the past few decades, the interests of european constitutionalism scholars 
have largely changed, and the most topical notion to study at the moment is the notion of identity. 
For example, P. Faraguna ironically admits, that “if the interests of european union law scholars could 
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the concept of “identity” parallelly appeared in constitutional judicial practice 
outside of europe. however, it was the consistent ratification of international treaties 
relating to the establishment and empowerment of the institutions of the european 
union, in particular the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties that prompted the emergence 
of modern scientific research on problematic.10
At the same time, other authors differently date the first mention of the concept 
of constitutional identity in decisions of european constitutional review bodies.
we consider it possible to support the point of view of those11 who see the formation 
of the basic foundations of this theory in the first decision of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany issued after its establishment,12 in which the court formulated 
a number of principal conceptual provisions regarding its powers, approaches to 
the interpretation of the Basic Law of Germany, as well as concerning the model of 
building federal relations that were of great importance for the unification of Germany 
in the postwar years.13
this is the Southwest State case (1951),14 in which the Court reviewed the consti-
tutionality of German laws15 and served as the basis on which the south-western lands 
of Germany later merged. And although in this case the concept of constitutional 
be gauged through twitter, a trending topic would likely be: #identity.” See Pietro Faraguna, Taking 
Constitutional Identities Away from the Courts, 41(2) Brooklyn Journal of international Law 491, 492 (2016). 
Other researchers also admit, that “[t]o protect national sovereignty is passé; to protect national identity 
by insisting on constitutional specificity is à la mode.” See Joseph h.h. weiler, On the Power of the Word: 
Europe’s Constitutional Iconography, 3(2-3) international Journal of Constitutional Law 173, 184 (2005).
10  Faraguna 2016, at 493. the assertion that the consistent ratification of the Lisbon treaty by the member 
states of the european union, initiated a modern discussion on the problems of constitutional identity, 
is generally recognized in literature. José L. Martí, Two Different Ideas of Constitutional Identity: Identity of 
the Constitution v. Identity of the People in National Constitutional Identity and European Integration, supra 
note 7. thus, we consider it necessary to emphasize that, until recently, the concept of constitutional 
identity was studied primarily from the point of view of the development of european union law and 
the question of the interaction of national constitutional courts with the european Court of Justice. 
At the same time, at the present stage this problem has long gone beyond the consideration of 
exclusively problems of legal integration within the eu, which in turn is due to increased activity from 
other intergovernmental organizations and supranational institutions whose purpose is to protect 
human rights at the international level, in particular, the european Court of human rights, operating 
under the Council of europe, and the inter-American Court of human rights.
11  Martí 2013, at 18.
12  the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany was established on the basis of Article 92 of the Basic 
Law of Germany, adopted on 23 May 1949.
13  Gerhard Leibholz, The Federal Constitutional Court in Germany and the “Southwest Case,” 46(3) American 
Political science review 723 (1952).
14  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Southwest State, 1 BverfGe 14 (1951).
15  we are talking about the so-called First and second reorganization Laws (Neugliederungsgesetz), 
according to which the south-western region of Germany was to be reorganized, and the question 
of uniting the lands of württemberg-Baden, Baden and württemberg-hohenzollern was to be solved. 
See Leibholz 1952, at 723–724.
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identity was not formulated directly, the fundamental nature of the legal positions 
expressed by the Court in this decision, in fact, allows us to agree that it was in this 
decision that the basic foundations of this concept were laid.16
the central of them seems to be the position of the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany, according to which
each constitutional clause is in a definite relationship with all other clauses, 
and that together they form an entity. it considers certain constitutional 
principles and basic concepts to have emerged from the whole of the Basic 
Law to which other constitutional regulations are subordinate.17
however, not all authors propose to consider this case as the first example 
of a decision in which a national constitutional court turned to the concept of 
constitutional identity.
examples of constitutional decisions, within which this concept was formulated 
and used for its justification, can be referred to in the 1970s–1980s. they are linked 
(along with processes of opposition to european national constitutional courts) to 
the promotion of the doctrine of primacy18 of eu law over national legislation by 
the Court of the european union.19
thus the concept, according to some authors, which laid down approaches to 
the understanding of constitutional identity, was formulated by the Constitutional 
Court of italy as the doctrine of “counter-limits,”20 or constitutional limits within which 
the international and european law rules are allowed to apply in the national italian 
legal system.21
in response to the proclamation of the doctrine of absolute legal supremacy of the 
european law over national law of participating countries, the Constitutional Court 
16  Martí 2013.
17  Leibholz 1952, at 725. According to the authors, this legal position corresponds to an understanding of 
constitutional identity as the core provisions of the Constitution. this concept will be discussed below.
18  Also: “absolute precedency.”
19  See diana-urania Galetta, European Union Law in the Jurisprudence of Italian High Courts: Is the Counter-
Limits Doctrine a Dog That Barks but Does Not Bite?, 21(4) european Public Law 747 (2015).
20  Исполинов А.С. Приоритет права Европейского Союза и национальная (конституционная) иден-
тичность в решениях Суда ЕС и конституционных судов государств – членов ЕС // Сравнительное 
конституционное обозрение. 2017. № 4(119). С. 55 [Alexey s. ispolinov, The Priority of EU Law and 
National (Constitutional) Identity in the Decisions of the European Court of Justice and the Constitutional 
Courts of the EU Member-States, 4(119) Comparative Constitutional review 47, 55 (2017)].
21  See Исполинов А.С. Вопросы взаимодействия международного и внутреннего права в решениях 
Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации // Российский юридический журнал. 2017. № 1. 
С. 73–93 [Alexey s. ispolinov, Issues of Relationship of International and Domestic Law in the Judgments 
of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, 1 russian Legal Journal 73 (2017)].
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of italy in its decision of 18 december 1973 in the case of Frontini22 and a little later in 
the decision of 8 June 1984 in the case of Granital23 indicated that such restrictions 
on sovereignty are not allowed if they contradict the constitutional order or violate 
fundamental rights protected by the constitution.
unfolding its position, the Constitutional Court of italy referred to Article 11 of the 
Constitution of italy, according to which italy agrees, on conditions of equality with 
other states, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order 
ensuring peace and justice among the Nations.24
interpreting this norm, the Court,
asserted that the state’s powers are now limited in the areas of legislative, 
judicial and executive functions by the attribution of part of these powers to 
the Community. in the field of Community competence, these functions are 
exercised by Community institutions, with Community forms and procedures, 
and according to Community guarantees: the Community is not be expected 
to operate through italian forms or with italian guarantees, such as referendum 
or judicial review by the Constitutional Court.25
the Court also stated that
Community institutions are not empowered to break fundamental 
constitutional principles or fundamental rights. should the Community have 
the power to affect these principles and rights, italian sovereignty would be 
effectively nullified. such a power to nullify italian sovereignty is not included 
within Article 11 of the Constitution. the state may agree to restrict its 
sovereignty under Article 11 of the Constitution; however, the annulment of 
sovereignty exceeds its authority granted by the constitutional provision.26
thus the prototype of the concept of constitutional identity in italian constitutional 
judicial practice was the doctrine of counter-limits or constitutional limits, which the 
italian Constitutional Court defined as the fundamental constitutional principles and 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
22  Constitutional Court of italy, Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, Case No. 183, 27 december 1973, 
[1974] 2 C.M.L.r. 372.
23  Constitutional Court of italy, S.p.a. Granital v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case No. 170, 
8 June 1984, [1984] C.M.L.r. 756.
24  Constitution of the italian republic (Nov. 1, 2019), available at https://www.senato.it/documenti/
repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf.
25  Maria Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System 
and the European Community, 12(1) Michigan Journal of international Law 173, 180 (1990).
26  Id. at 181.
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Admitting the importance of the italian constitutional judicial practice in the 
formation of the doctrine of constitutional identity, the majority of contemporary 
authors proceed from the fact that it was formulated by the Constitutional Court of 
Germany for the first time in the case of Solange I,27 largely because the terminology 
“identity” was used there directly for the first time.28
As noted in the literature,
[t]he main thrust of the judgement was to reserve a right for the 
Constitutional Court to review secondary law adopted by the then european 
economic Community (eeC) against the fundamental rights of the German 
Constitution until a european charter of rights had been adopted that 
equalled the protection provided in the Constitution.29
the Constitutional Court defended its right to review with reference to the fact 
that fundamental rights formed part of the essential structure of the Constitution or 
its identity, and added that the transfer of the sovereign powers of the eeC could not 
lead to a change in the identity of the Constitution without formally amending it. it 
is important to note that the German Constitutional Court reduced “constitutional 
identity to the foundational principles from which the fundamental rights in the 
Constitution were deduced, instead of equating identity with the rights as such.”30
the concept of constitutional identity in the practices of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany was developed in the decision concerning Germany’s ratification 
of the Maastricht treaty (Maastricht Treaty judgment).31 in a show of judicial activism, 
the Constitutional Court allowed a group of private petitioners to challenge the 
constitutionality of the act of parliament consenting to the treaty even though they 
had not yet been directly affected by the act.32
reviewing the constitutionality of this act, the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany, however, indicated that Germany is entitled to participate in the european 
union only if this does not violate the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 79 of the 
German Constitution. these provisions of the Basic Law of Germany are the so-called 
“eternity clause” – a number of constitutional provisions or core principles of German 
Constitution that may not be amended.
27  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Solange I, 37 BverfGe 271 (1974).
28  Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Review of EU Law After Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship 
Between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice, 48(1) Common Market Law 
review 9 (2011).
29  Gerhard van der schyff, EU Member State Constitutional Identity: A Comparison of Germany and the 
Netherlands as Polar Opposites, 76 Zaörv 167, 170 (2016).
30  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Maastricht Treaty, 89 BverfGe 155 (1993), paras. 58 & 63.
31  van der schyff 2016, at 170.
32  Maastricht Treaty case, supra note 30, paras. 58 & 63.
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According to this Article, amendments to the Basic Law of Germany affecting the 
division of the Federation into Länder, their participation in principle in the legislative 
process as well as the provisions concerning the inviolability and inalienability of 
human rights, the principle of democratic and social state, people’s sovereignty, and 
the people’s right to resist are inadmissible.33
with the process of enlargement of the european union in 2004–2007, the 
doctrine of constitutional identity is becoming increasingly influential. As noted 
in the literature, the adoption of the Lisbon treaty provoked a heated discussion 
about the risks of the final loss of national identity by member states of the european 
union and caused the “domino effect” in the form of a whole series of decisions of 
constitutional and higher courts of most eu member states (France, Austria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Germany, hungary, Poland, Czech republic, denmark, ireland, etc.).34
the fact that the concept of constitutional identity was most promoted after 
the adoption of the treaty of Lisbon, in our opinion, is caused by two fundamental 
innovations of this document. Firstly, the expansion of the jurisdictional powers 
of the Court of Justice of the european union and consolidation of its exclusive 
right to interpret and apply the Charter of the european union on human rights.35 
secondly, the substantial expansion of the notion of “national identity,” the clause on 
the recognition and respect of which was contained in Article 6(3) of the Maastricht 
treaty prior to making the appropriate amendments.
thus, according to the first version of this norm, “the union shall respect the 
national identities of its Member states,”36 As noted in the literature, prior to the 
innovations, this article was a “sleeping norm,” practically not used by the Court of the 
european union and of a more political nature, that meaningfully covered the national 
linguistic, ethnic, religious and cultural characteristics of states, not encompassing 
constitutional political aspects.37 with the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, the concept 
of identity became interpreted in a constitutional and legal, not only in a cultural and 
linguistic, aspect.38 thus, under the new provisions of Article 4(2),
33  Basic Law for the Federal republic of Germany (Nov. 1, 2019), available at https://www.btg-bestell 
service.de/pdf/80201000.pdf.
34  Mattias wendel, Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 7(1) european Constitutional Law 
review 96 (2011).
35  this fact further complicated the already complex relationship between the eu Court and the national 
constitutional courts, because they were authorized to interpret similar human rights norms, only 
the eu Court on the basis of the Charter, and the constitutional courts on the basis of national 
constitutions. the latter situation inevitably had the consequences of interpretative competition.
36  See Leonard F.M. Besselink, National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon, 6(3) utrecht 
Law review 36, 40 (2010).
37  Besselink 2010.
38  See Васильева Т.А. Концепция суверенитета в условиях глобализации и европейской интеграции // 
Конституционное и муниципальное право. 2016. № 2. С. 7–9 tatiana A. vasilieva, The Sovereignty Concept 
in Conditions of Globalization and European Integration, 2 Constitutional and Municipal Law 7 (2016)].
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[t]he union shall respect the equality of Member states before the treaties 
as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.  
it shall respect their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the state, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national 
security. in particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member state.39
such a broad formulation of the concept of “national identity” in the Lisbon treaty 
version allowed a number of authors to make the conclusion that focusing of the 
new norm on the functional features of the state shifted the emphasis on identity 
from national to constitutional, which ultimately led to european constitutional 
courts developing their own concepts of constitutional state identity.40
German Constitutional Court practice remains the most well-known in this period, 
within which the Court verified the compliance of the Lisbon treaty with the provisions 
of the Basic Law of Germany and which attracted attention from a wide range of 
european scholars to the very problems of constitutional identity.41 in particular, the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany stated that it was competent to consider 
eu acts for their compliance with the “constitutional identity” of the Basic Law of the 
Federal republic of Germany and not only allow but also oblige the government not 
to execute eu acts and take measures to protect constitutional identity.42
developing this concept, the Constitutional Court of Germany, in particular, 
pointed out that the state is a natural and primary space for the expression of 
democracy in a pan-european constitutional space. with this in mind, constitutional 
identity includes the sovereign statehood of Germany, which cannot be alienated 
through further european integration.43
defining the sphere of identity, the Court listed the number of essential functions 
of the state, over which the loss of control entails the loss of sovereignty. in particular, 
the Court found that integration should leave sufficient space for the political 
39  treaty of Lisbon amending the treaty on european union and the treaty establishing the european 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 december 2007 (Nov. 1, 2019), available at https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/hr/tXt/?uri=CeLeX:12007L/tXt.
40  Besselink 2010.
41  Martí 2013.
42  Красинский В.В. Защита государственного суверенитета [vladislav v. krasinsky, Protection of State 
Sovereignty] (Moscow: NOrMA, 2017).
43  Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Lisbon Treaty, 123 BverfGe 267 (2009), para. 216. See daniel 
thym, Attack or Retreat? Evolving Themes and Strategies of the Judicial Dialogue Between the German 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice in Constitutional Conversations in Europe: Actors, 
Topics and Procedures 235, 242 (M. Claes et al. (eds.), Antwerp: intersentia, 2012); dieter Grimm, 
Defending Sovereign Statehood Against Transforming the Union into a State, 5(3) european Constitutional 
Law 353 (2009).
RUSSIAN LAw JOURNAL     Volume VII (2019) Issue 4 108
formation of economic, cultural and social spheres of society in member states. 
the court ruled that this also includes democratic decisions concerning criminal 
law, the state’s monopoly on the use of armed forces, issues of state revenues and 
expenditures, the German concept of a welfare state, as well as decisions relating to 
culturally important areas of society, such as family law, education and religion.44
As noted in the literature, the concept of constitutional identity, formulated by 
the German Constitutional Court in the decision on the Lisbon case, played a major 
role not only in determining the application of european law in national law, but 
also the fate of further German integration into the eu.45 As G. Gadzhiev rightly 
observes, in this case the judicial doctrine of constitutional identity was an important 
guarantee for the protection of national sovereignty.46
the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Czech republic, which twice 
examined the issue of the compliance with the provisions of the Lisbon treaty 
with the constitution of the country47 and in both cases addressed the concept of 
sovereignty to determine the constitutional identity of the state, is also indicative. 
thus, in the resolution of 26 November 2008, the Court admitted, that there are 
certain limits on the transfer of state’s sovereign powers to the supranational level, 
that “should be left primarily to the legislature to specify, because this is a priori 
a political question, which provides the legislature wide discretion.”48 in its Judgment 
of 11 March 2009, the Court expressed its position that
in a modern democratic state governed by the rule of law, the sovereignty 
of the state is not an aim in and of itself, that is, in isolation, but is a means for 
fulfilling the fundamental values on which the construction of a democratic 
state governed by the rule of law stands.49
he stated that the main manifestation of sovereignty is the ability to continue to 
dispose of sovereign rights or to transfer certain powers, temporarily or permanently. 
44  Lisbon Treaty case, supra note 43.
45  van der schyff 2016, at 176.
46  See Гаджиев Г.А. Конституционная идентичность и права человека в России [Gadis A. Gadzhiev, 
Constitutional Identity and Human Rights in Russian Federation] (Nov. 1, 2019), available at http://
www.ksrf.ru/ru/News/documents/report_%d0%93%d0%B0%d0%B4%d0%B6%d0%B8%d0%B5
%d0%B2%20_2016.pdf.
47  vasilieva 2016, at 8.
48  Constitutional Court of the Czech republic, Judgment of 26 November 2008, Pl. Ús 19/08: Treaty of 
Lisbon I, para. 109 (Nov. 1, 2019), available at https://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/20081126-pl-us-
1908-treaty-of-lisbon-i-1/.
49  Constitutional Court of the Czech republic, Judgment of 3 November 2009, Pl. Ús 29/09: Treaty of 
Lisbon II, para. 147 (Nov. 1, 2019), available at https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2013/10/22/
c746a974-58eb-4907-b022-c9f486b6c3d2/publishable_en.pdf.
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it is also interesting that the Constitutional Court of the Czech republic indicated that 
the Court can review whether any act by union bodies exceeded the powers that 
the Czech republic transferred to the european union, in particular, “abandoning 
the identity of values.”50
in Latvia, the Constitutional Court also indicated that
there shall exist states and their fundamental constitutional structures, 
as well as their values, principles, and basic rights that cannot be lost by 
establishing a supranational organization.51
thus, the emergence and further formation of the doctrine of constitutional 
identity in the european constitutional law enforcement practice is not the least 
connected with eu integration processes and, in our opinion, the need to create 
a counterweight to the expansion of the jurisdiction of supranational bodies in order 
to protect the sovereignty of member states.
the use of the doctrine of constitutional identity as a legal means of combating 
the unreasonable expansion of the jurisdictional powers of supranational bodies 
and their influence on national legal systems is characteristic not only of european 
states in their relations with the european union, but also for the countries of the 
south American continent in relations with the inter-American Court of human 
rights. Noteworthy in this case is the example of the supreme Court of Argentina, 
which in its decision of 14 February 2014, for the first time in its history, recognized 
as impracticable the decision of this supranational body referring to its contradiction 
of the constitutional identity of Argentina in its understanding by the supreme 
Court.52
the problem of interaction between national and interstate jurisdictions also has 
significant meaning for russia. in particular, the concept of constitutional identity 
was first formulated in the russian legal doctrine by the Constitutional Court of the 
russian Federation in its ruling of 14 July 2015 No. 21-P.53
50 Treaty of Lisbon II, supra note 49, para. 150.
51  Constitutional Court of the republic of Latvia, Judgment on Behalf of the republic of Latvia, riga, 
7 April 2009, Case No. 2008-35-01 (Nov. 1, 2019), available at http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/wp-content/
uploads/2008/09/2008-35-01_spriedums_eNG.pdf.
52  Зорькин В.Д. Право против хаоса [valery d. Zorkin, Law Against Chaos] 210 (Moscow: NOrMA; 
iNFrA-M, 2018).
53  Постановление Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации от 14 июля 2015 г. № 21-П «По 
делу о проверке конституционности положений статьи 1 Федерального закона «О ратификации 
Конвенции о защите прав человека и основных свобод и Протоколов к ней», пунктов 1 и 2 статьи 32 
Федерального закона «О международных договорах Российской Федерации», частей первой 
и четвертой статьи 11, пункта 4 части четвертой статьи 392 Гражданского процессуального 
кодекса Российской Федерации, частей 1 и 4 статьи 13, пункта 4 части 3 статьи 311 Арбитражного 
процессуального кодекса Российской Федерации, частей 1 и 4 статьи 15, пункта 4 части 1 статьи 350 
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the central subject of consideration of the Court was a question concerning the 
relationship between the provisions of international treaties and the Constitution of 
the russian Federation. As it is known, it was in this decision that the Constitutional 
Court indicated the possibility implementing international treaties within domestic 
law and order only by recognition of the supremacy and the highest legal force of 
the Constitution of the russian Federation.54
regarding the concept of “constitutional identity,” the Court noted the 
following:
the interaction of the european and constitutional order is impossible in 
conditions of subordination, since only a dialogue between different legal 
systems is the basis of their proper balance. it is precisely this approach 
that the european Court of human rights is called upon to adhere to in 
its activities as an interstate subsidiary judicial body, and it is from their 
respect for the national constitutional identity of the states parties to the 
Convention for the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
depends largely on the effectiveness of its norms in the domestic legal order. 
the special attention of supranational bodies to the basic elements of this 
constitutional identity, which form the domestic norms on fundamental 
rights, as well as the norms guaranteeing these rights on the foundations 
of the constitutional system, will reduce the likelihood of conflict between 
national and supranational law, which, in turn, will largely determine – while 
maintaining the constitutional sovereignty of states – the effectiveness of the 
entire european system of protecting the rights and freedoms of man and 
citizen and further harmonization of european legal space in this area.55
Кодекса административного судопроизводства Российской Федерации и пункта 2 части 
четвертой статьи 413 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса Российской Федерации в связи 
с запросом группы депутатов Государственной Думы» // Российская газета. 2015. № 163 [ruling of 
the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation No. 21-P of 14 July 2015. On the Case of verifying the 
Constitutionality of the Provisions of Article 1 of the Federal Law “On ratification of the Convention for 
the Protection of human rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Protocols thereto,” Paragraphs 1 
and 2 of Article 32 of the Federal Law “On international treaties of the russian Federation,” Parts 1 and 4 
of Article 11, Clause 4 of Part 4 of Article 392 of the Civil Procedure Code of the russian Federation, 
Parts 1 and 4 of Article 13, Clause 4 of Part 3 of Article 311 of the Arbitration Procedure Code of the 
russian Federation, Parts 1 and 4 of Article 15, Paragraph 4 of Part 1 of Article 350 of the Code of 
Administrative Procedure of the russian Federation, and Clause 2 of Paragraph 4 of Article 413 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code of the russian Federation due in Connection with request of a Group 
of deputies of the state duma,” rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2015, No. 163].
54  in pursuance of the provisions of this resolution, the legislator also adopted the Federal Constitutional 
Law of 14 december 2015 No. 7 “On Amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Constitutional 
Court of the russian Federation,’” which established the authority of the Constitutional Court of the 
russian Federation to resolve the issue of the possibility of execution of decisions of the interstate body 
for the protection of human rights and freedoms on the territory of the russian Federation.
55  See ruling of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation No. 21-P, supra note 53.
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An analysis of the above position of the Constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation allows us to conclude that it is typical for the russian constitutional judicial 
practice to consider constitutional identity as a phenomenon essentially consisting 
of a set of elements, the basic ones of which are the provisions of the Constitution of 
the russian Federation on fundamental rights and foundations of the constitutional 
system. At the same time, starting from the position of the Constitutional Court of 
the russian Federation, it also seems possible to assert that the Court did not indicate 
that the specified set of elements is exhaustive. therefore, it is possible to assume 
the presence of the others. Anyway, this legal position was expressed by the Court 
in the context of the broader issues of interaction between the russian national and 
interstate jurisdiction of the european Court of human rights.
however, as practice shows, turning to constitutional identity as a justification 
for its decisions by constitutional judicial control bodies does not always indicate 
a conflict between national and international jurisdictional bodies and the need to 
uphold the sovereign powers of a state in relations with supranational associations, 
and may be due to the presence of a number of internal causes.
the example of india is notable in this context, in which the formation of the 
concept of constitutional identity is associated with the procedure for amending 
the Constitution of india. As a number of researchers note, the indian supreme 
Court confronted the problem of constitutional identity much more explicitly and 
directly than have the courts in most countries, the objective reason of which was 
the attempt to amend the Constitution of india, which essentially contradicted the 
Constitution of india itself.56
solving the above problem, the supreme Court of india developed the doctrine 
of the basic structure of the constitution, according to which certain provisions of 
the indian Constitution are recognized as fundamental to ensure its integrity and 
warrant its immunity from significant change57. the power to make amendments 
are subject to implied limitations inherent in the basic structure of the Constitution 
of india.58
Justifying the existence of the so-called implicit substantive limits to constitutional 
revision, supreme Court in its decision on the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State 
of Kerala indicated that, the expression “amendment of this Constitution” does not 
enable Parliament to abrogate or take away, fundamental rights or to completely 
change the fundamental features of the Constitution so as to destroy its identity. 
within these limits Parliament can amend every article.59
56  Jacobsohn 2006, at 376.
57  Id.
58  Śledzińska-simon 2015, at 124.
59  supreme Court of india, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 s.C.C. 225, para. 569 (Nov. 1, 
2019), also available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/257876/.
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in another, later decision, the Court also stated that, if by constitutional amend-
ment, Parliament were granted unlimited power of amendment, it would cease to 
be an authority under the Constitution, but would become supreme over it, because 
it would have power to alter the entire Constitution including its basic structure and 
even to put an end to it by totally changing its identity.60
Another interesting case is America, where the concept of the constitutional 
identity was not directly formulated by the u.s. supreme Court. At the same time 
its identity has attracted great interest from the scientific community and has been 
deeply studied in American doctrine not only as constitutional identity as a concept 
but also as America’s national identity.
As some authors point out, American national identity depends entirely on the 
u.s. Constitution.61 this means in particular that the u.s. Constitution is a means by 
which the American people represent themselves as Americans, an act of uniting 
them and expressing their outward identity as a nation.62
As stated in the literature, this is a unique phenomenon inherent only to America. 
in other countries, national identity is usually associated with circumstances that 
do not directly follow from the adoption of the Constitution63 and sometimes it is 
based on imaginary pre-political bonds between society and the state due to ethnic, 
religious reasons and shared by ethnic groups, stemming from non-legal, political 
sources.64 however, the starting point of national American identity is precisely the 
u.s. Constitution.
For the reason that the u.s. supreme Court “has the last word” in interpreting 
the provisions of the Constitution, some authors confirm that the u.s. supreme 
Court is the body by which national identity is expressed through a constitutional 
interpretation.65 thus, the problem of constitutional interpretation, as the authors 
note, becomes central to the definition of American constitutional identity.66
in view of the importance given to the interpretive activity of the supreme 
Court of America in forming American national identity, it is interesting to read the 
60  supreme Court of india, Minerva Mills v. Union of India, A.i.r. 1980 s.C. 1789, para. 92 (Nov. 1, 2019), also 
available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1215719/.
61  Akhil r. Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We Live By (New york: 
Basic Books, 2012); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics (indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962); Jacobsohn 2006.
62  Michel rosenfeld, The Identity of the Constitutional Subject: Selfhood, Citizenship, Culture, and Community 
79 (London: routledge, 2012).
63  Bruce Ackerman, We the People. Vol. 1: Foundations 36 (Cambridge, Mass.: harvard university Press, 1991).
64  rosenfeld 2012, at 152–156.
65  Or Bassok, Interpretative Theories as Roadmaps to Constitutional Identity: The Case of the United States, 
4(3) Global Constitutionalism 289 (2015)
66  Id.
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reflections of individual authors who have linked the development of this concept 
with the problem of the use of so-called constitutional borrowing67, existing in the 
interpretational practice of the supreme Court of the united states.
As noted in the literature, because of American judicial comparativistics serious 
questions were raised regarding the legitimacy (legality) of using foreign sources in 
determining the meaning of the provisions of the national constitution.68
the impetuses for the actualization of this topic in scientific research were the 
three decisions of the u.s. supreme Court, adopted in a relatively short time, in 
which the Court, when justifying its decisions concerning the constitutional rights 
of citizens, referred to approaches to solving similar problems in foreign legislation 
and the judicial enforcement practice of international justice bodies.69
there are three significant cases to mention. First, Atkins v. Virginia,70 in which the 
Court relied on the opinion of the international community in addressing the issue 
of the inadmissibility of the execution of the mentally retarded. second, Lawrence v. 
Texas,71 in which the opinion of the court was based on the shared values of western 
civilization and reasoned with reference to the position of the european Court of 
human rights (eCthr). Finally, there is Roper v. Simmons,72 in which the subject of 
consideration of the court was the fact, that the united states remained at that time 
the only country in the world that gave official sanction to juvenile death penalty.
the imposition of such decisions was accompanied by not only expressing by the 
judges of the u.s. supreme Court disagreed with this justification, their dissenting 
opinions, but also by a storm of criticism from the scientific community. this fact was 
also a reason for Congressional amendments to legislation that specifically required 
a ban for u.s. judges to refer to foreign sources of law in cases when it is not provided 
by the legislation and is not necessary for the resolution of the case.73
67  See Śledzińska-simon 2015, at 131; wiktor Osiatyński, Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1(2) 
international Journal of Constitutional Law 244 (2003).
68  Id.
69  it is proposed to consider references to foreign law and law enforcement practice as cases of 
constitutional borrowing. See stephen A. simon. The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional 
Rights Cases: An Empirical Study, 1(2) Journal of Law and Courts 279 (2013).
70  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 u.s. 304 (2002).
71  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 u.s. 558 (2003).
72  Roper v. Simmons, 543 u.s. 551 (2004).
73  in particular, it was proposed to amend the united states Code, providing for an article fixing special 
restrictions on the use of foreign law by the federal courts. According to the provisions of this article, 
it was proposed to fix that the case cannot be resolved in the federal courts on the basis of foreign 
law, except in cases where such use is permitted by the Constitution or acts of Congress. h. r. 973: 
to amend title 28, united states Code, to prevent the misuse of foreign law in Federal courts, and for 
other purposes (Nov. 1, 2019), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BiLLs-112hr973ih/pdf/
BiLLs-112hr973ih.pdf.
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the most famous is the decision made in 2003, namely Lawrence v. Texas, in which 
the Court, contrary to its previous case law in Bowers v. Hardwick,74 found incompatible 
the rules of the criminal law of the state of texas, that recognized the sexual relations of 
persons of the same gender a crime, with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the u.s. Constitution, which enshrines the principle of equality of citizens before the 
law. reasoning this decision, the Court specifically referred to the relevant practice of the 
eCthr in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,75 in which the eCthr declared the provisions of the 
criminal law prohibiting male homosexual contact non-complying with the eCthr and 
pointed out that America shared similar values of modern western civilization.76
that last argument triggered a wave of disagreement and, in particular, has been 
criticized by the judge A. scalia in his dissenting opinion on the case in which the 
judge noted that the right to sodomy (right to homosexual sodomy) is contrary to 
the specified position of the court and is deeply contrary to America’s national history 
and traditions as well as Christian morals and ethical standards.77
Later in the literature, critics of this decision recognized the admissibility of 
constitutional borrowing at the stage of writing the constitution, but not at the 
stage of interpreting the constitutional provisions for the reason that it “destroys the 
foundations of democratic self-government”78 and contradicts the very precedent 
practice of the u.s. supreme Court, in which the court recognizes the “comparative 
analysis inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course 
quite relevant to the task of writing one.”79 within the framework of the latter case, the 
discussion focused on the substantive content of the principle of federalism, while 
interpreting which the Court applied to the original ideas of the founding fathers and 
emphasized the fact that the American understanding of federalism is not identical to 
the european understanding.80 the result of such criticism was that in later decisions 
on similar cases,81 the court refused to reference foreign experience on principle.
At the same time, as noted in the literature, the use of constitutional borrowing in 
the law enforcement practice of the u.s. supreme Court in resolving disputes relating 
to the constitutional rights of citizens, although it has a long history, is indicatively 
small compared to other jurisdictions.82
74  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 u.s. 186 (1986).
75  Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, [1981] 4 e.h.r.r. 149, [1981] e.C.h.r. 5.
76  Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 71.
77  Id. (scalia, J. diss.).
78  vlad F. Perju, Constitutional Transplants, Borrowing, and Migrations in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Constitutional Law 1304 (M. rosenfeld & A. sajó (eds.), Oxford: Oxford university Press, 2012).
79  Printz v. United States, 521 u.s. 989 (1995).
80  Id.
81  United States v. Windsor, 570 u.s. (2013).
82  thus, in the framework of special empirical studies it was have found, that to May 2012 the u.s. 
supreme Court only in 63 cases have referred to foreign legal sources, in particular, legislation and 
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thus, the issues of constitutional identity in American doctrine and constitutional 
law enforcement practice are suggested to be viewed through the prism of the 
problems of interpretation and use of constitutional borrowing, which, according 
to the authors, underlines the fact that the concept of constitutional identity is not 
the least related to issues of constitutional interpretation.
the constitutional judicial practice that we cited demonstrates the difference of 
approaches in defining the concept of constitutional identity, linking it in some cases 
with fundamental constitutional principles and rights (italy), the sovereign powers 
of the state (Germany), the presence of provisions relating to the basic structure of 
the Constitution abolition or change (india), as well as the need to maintain national 
legal traditions (the usA).83
the analysis of constitutional judicial practice, in which the concept of constitu-
tional identity develops, demonstrates a number of circumstances. in authors’ opinion, 
using the doctrine of constitutional identity as a justification of constitutional decisions 
is not in the least determined by external objective circumstances. Moreover, these 
circumstances, as a rule, are negative in terms of the stable functioning of the state 
and consist, for example, in the form of a threat of complete loss of sovereignty, the 
need to ensure the territorial integrity and constitutional stability of the state.
this circumstance allows us to say that the doctrine of constitutional identity in 
each individual state at each separate stage of its development is filled with a separate 
specific national and historical content, based, first, on the specifics of the national 
legal system, cultural, legal and historical traditions, and secondly is determined by 
those objective legal challenges that need to be addressed by the state in a particular 
historical period of time.
if we consider the set of problems through the prism of basic conceptual terms 
that exist in the theory of constitutional law, then it should be noted that the concept 
of constitutional identity is most associated with such notions as constitutional 
principles and constitutional values, constitutional traditions, constitutional 
interpretation, state sovereignty and not also the issues of interaction between 
national interstate jurisdictions.
2. The Notion of Constitutional Identity as a Subject  
of Scholarly Debate
such intensive use of the concept of “constitutional identity” by constitutional 
review bodies around the world has intensified the interest of law scholars, both 
law enforcement practice as a justification for its decision in cases involving the constitutional rights of 
citizens. it seems that the given data can be considered as relevant in view of its apparent significance. 
See simon 2013, at 279–301.
83  As noted in the literature, the concept of constitutional identity has three spheres of its application: 
1) in decisions concerning the legitimacy of amendments; 2) decisions related to the dialogue of 
courts of different legal systems; 3) decisions concerning integration issues within supranational 
organizations. See Śledzińska-simon 2015.
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constitutional and international, in this concept. Based on the analysis of relevant 
constitutional judicial practice, a number of authors have proposed their own 
theoretical approaches to its definition.
thus, one of the most cited and shared positions is that constitutional identity 
represents a set of fundamental constitutional provisions that constitute the 
substantial (inviolable, essential) core of the constitution.
As G. Gadzhiev points out, aspects of constitutional identity are, “especially protected 
parts of the constitutional text that make up the core of the national constitutional 
order.”84
At the same time, as noted by researchers who share this position, not every 
provision of the constitution is an integral part of its core, but only those of them for 
which changes will indicate an alteration to the constitution as a whole.85 in other 
words, not all constitutional provisions are equally important86 for the establishment of 
constitutional identity. it is important to consider only those of them for which rejection 
of their implementation would mean the rejection of the essence of democracy.87
it seems that a similar approach to the consideration of constitutional identity 
of the state has been proposed by authors that rely more on the law enforcement 
practices of the supreme Court of india, which developed the doctrine of the “basic 
structure” of the constitution, as well as the position of the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany, particularly in the Maastricht Treaty case which has been brought 
and described above.
in the context of the considered position (that constitutional identity is a set of 
constitutional provisions expressing the specifics of a particular constitution and the 
amending of which actually indicates the termination of its action in its original form), 
it is notable that, in our opinion, it is impossible to reduce the constitutional identity 
to a set of positive norms and it is also necessary to take into account constitutional 
traditions and constitutional values shared by society and the interpretation of the 
bodies of constitutional judicial control. As confirmation of this circumstance, it is 
necessary to refer to the above practice of the Constitutional Courts of the Czech 
republic, Latvia and the u.s. supreme Court.
in this regard, we consider it possible to note and support the point of view of those 
authors who propose reducing the constitutional identity not only to the text of the 
constitution itself, but also to the interpretation given to it by the constitutional courts,88 
84  Gadzhiev, supra note 46.
85  Martí 2013, at 17.
86  Id.
87  Élise Besson, Les principes suprêmes inviolables dans la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle 
italienne : véritable limite ou simple précaution démocratique ?, 21 Annuaire international de justice 
constitutionnelle 11, 20 (2005). Cited by Filatova 2013.
88  rosenfeld 2012, at 79.
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as well as constitutional values revealed from the text of the constitution,89 as ideas that are 
recognized as meaningful for the development of society and the state in a given period 
of time. As noted in the literature, constitutional identity is a constitutional “core” – “a set 
of fundamental values and principles that cannot be the subject of compromise.”90
taking also into account the position of the Constitutional Court of the russian 
Federation, it is possible to substantively determine constitutional identity as a set of 
elements allowing to determine the constitution and the state established on its basis 
with all the features of its internal constitutional order, taking into account temporal 
and geographical factors. in other words, it is a set of those elements that allow the 
possibility to determine the specificity of the constitutional structure of a state in the 
world community at a specific historical period of time. the corresponding point of 
view was expressed by A. klishas and, in our opinion, deserves full support.91
Another approach is to define constitutional identity as an argumentative 
method used in constitutional judicial practice.
As, for example, A. rainer notes that
constitutional identity is a conceptual instrument of defense against her 
too far-reaching supranationalization of the states’ legal orders, a defense of 
the substantive and functional existence of the state, which finds its particular 
expression in the basic political decisions and the core elements of its legal 
culture which is the value basis of the state’s Constitution.92
G. Gadzhiev also points out that
the russian version of constitutional identity as a judicial doctrine and 
a method for resolving constitutional disputes is created so that the system 
of constitutional courts in europe ... becomes harmonious, balanced and 
self-developing.93
89  Gary J. Jacobsohn, Constitutional Values and Principles in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Consti-
tutional Law, supra note 78, at 777.
90  Id.
91  See Клишас А.А. К вопросу о конституционной идентичности // Журнал конституционного право-
судия. 2018. № 6. C. 27–37 [Andrey A. klishas, To the Question on Constitutional Identity, 6 Journal of 
Constitutional Justice 27 (2018)].
92  Arnold rainer, Constitutional Identity in European Constitutionalism (Nov. 1, 2019), available at http://
www.constcourt.md/public/files/file/conferinta_20ani/programul_conferintei/rainer_Arnold.pdf. 
(emphasis added)
93  See Гаджиев Г.А. Юбилейные заметки о конституционном развитии и о роли методологии в конс-
титуционной юстиции // Журнал конституционного правосудия. 2017. № 1. С. 4 [Gadis A. Gadzhiev, 
Anniversary Notes on the Constitutional Development and the Role of Methodology in Constitutional 
Justice, 1 Journal of Constitutional Justice 1, 4 (2017)].
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the definition of constitutional identity as a legal argument is given by A. Blan-
kenagel.94 A similar approach is also shared by A. troitskaya and t. khramova.95 At the 
same time, the use of constitutional identity as a special argumentative method is 
regarded by the latter authors as a negative aspect of the practice of constitutional 
justice bodies.
so, for example, A. Blankenagel notes that
constitutional identity as a legal argument is redundant: constitutions can 
overcome undue interference of international law in the national legal order 
without resorting to some nebulous constitutional identity.96
the arguments of national constitutional courts with reference to constitutional 
identity also appear to the author controversial for the reasons that the appeal to her 
“makes the addressee believe that this is a scientific, and therefore an indisputable 
concept,”97 which implies the impossibility of its change for a separate social subject 
or, in other words, universality.
As noted by A. troitskaya and t. khramova,
in the practice of a number of constitutional control bodies, including 
the Constitutional Court of russia, in recent years the trend to turn to 
constitutional identity and state-forming values, in particular in the process of 
arguing decisions justifying deviating from the requirements of supranational 
legal documents, has been activated. At the same time it is hardly possible 
to follow a well-considered, uniform methodology of the interpretation of 
constitutional aspirations and the formulation of elements of identity (in 
practice as a whole, not only in cases involving supranational obligations),98
therefore the risks of manipulating arguments seem quite real to the authors.
without entering into a discussion on the fairness of the use of the concept of 
constitutional identity, it is possible to raise the question about the correctness of the 
characteristic of the phenomenon in question as an independent legal argument. in 
order to correctly answer this question it is necessary to turn to the main achievements of 
the theory of legal argumentation, in particular, the classification of legal arguments.
94  Blankenagel 2018, at 42.
95  See Троицкая А.А., Храмова Т.М. Основы основ: экспрессивный и функциональный потенциал 
конституционных устремлений // Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. 2018. № 1(122). 
С. 56 [Alexandra A. troitskaya & tatiana M. khramova, Constitutional Cornerstones: Expressive and Functional 
Potential of Constitutional Aspirations, 1(122) Comparative Constitutional review 54, 56 (2018)].
96  Blankenagel 2018, at 43.
97  Id.
98  troitskaya & khramova 2018, at 56.
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3. Basic Provisions of the Theory  
of Legal Argumentation Regarding the Classification  
of Legal Arguments. The Concept of Constitutional Identity  
as a Set of “Interpretative Arguments”
taking into account the existence of different approaches to the study of legal 
argumentation, namely logical, rhetorical and dialectical,99 in the present study it is 
possible to build on the achievements of the last of them, given the fact that most 
modern authoritative researchers adhere to it.
the key term for the purpose of the study of methods of argumentation within this 
direction is that of hard cases (“hard cases”). For the first time the term “hard cases” 
appeared in the works of the famous philosopher and theorist of law r. dworkin. 
the author understood those cases for which the existing provisions of the law do 
not provide an unambiguous solution, or, in other words, cases in which the rule of 
law applied by the judge cannot be interpreted unambiguously.100 this terminology 
was accepted and subsequently used by other researchers in order to build a theory 
of legal argumentation.
For example, in the literature it is indicated that those cases for which it is possible 
to substantiate various options for resolving them are hard cases.101 Other authors 
also note that hard cases concern legal issues that can be resolved and convincingly 
substantiated in different ways.102 According to A. Barak, “hard cases” are those cases 
in which the judge faces a number of possibilities, of which all are legitimate within 
the context of the system.103
when describing the concept of “hard cases,” the authors usually also indicate 
the reasons for their appearance in judicial practice. those are cases, for example, 
where judge is faced with the absence of an applicable rule of law, as well as with 
a situation in which the rule on the basis of which a legal dispute needs to be resolved 
is considered unclear or not quite adequate to apply to relevant relations, or is in 
contradiction with other applicable standards.104 in other words, the main reason for 
the emergence of hard cases is the existence of a legal norm with “open textuality” 
that is a norm that does not establish a clearly defined rule of conduct, formulated 
99  Feteris & kloosterhuis 2009.
100  ronald dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 9(1) Politics of interpretation 179 (1982).
101  donald h. Berman & Carole d. hafner, Indeterminacy: A Challenge to Logic-Based Models of Legal 
Reasoning, 3(1) international review of Law, Computers & technology 1 (1987).
102  Anne von der Lieth Gardner, An Artificial Intelligence Approach to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass.: 
the Mit Press, 1987).
103  See Барак А. Судейское усмотрение [Aharon Barak, The Judicial Discretion] 56 (Moscow: NOrMA, 1999).
104  Gustavo Zagrebelsky, Ronald Dworkin’s Principle Based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point of View, 1(4) 
international Journal of Constitutional Law 621, 625 (2003).
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in the most general, abstract way, and for this reason it needs an additional 
interpretation, on the basis of which it is necessary to resolve a legal dispute.105
the cited studies concerning the category of “hard cases” are also of decisive 
importance to the study of issues of the theory of argumentation, such as the 
classification of arguments into types.
it is indicated in the literature that,
in the analysis of legal argumentation, Aarnio, Alexy, MacCormick and 
Peczenik distinguish between the reconstruction of clear cases and hard 
cases. in clear cases, in which there is no difference of opinion about the facts, 
a single argument can be used to defend the decision. … in hard cases, in 
which the facts or rule are disputed, a further justification by means of a chain 
of arguments is required.106
in other words, the need for a chain of arguments arises when it is necessary to 
uphold a position relative to the facts or the content of the norms or, in the latter 
case, a position about their interpretation. Given the fact that in the practice of 
constitutional judicial review bodies addressed the issue regarding the conformity of 
certain provisions of the constitution acts precisely study questions of interpretation 
becomes crucial.
in this context, the classification of arguments presented by the famous German 
scientist robert Alexy into two separate groups is significant.107 thus, in the opinion of 
this author, the system of arguments can be divided into two blocks: the main (semantic 
and genetic) and additional (historical, comparative, teleological, and other) arguments. 
the first ones reflect the correctness of the correlation between the facts and the legal 
norms governing them that are applicable in a particular case. the latter perform the 
functions of interpretation and justify the choice of the applicable law.108
105  See Jaap C. hage et al., Hard Cases: A Procedural Approach, 2(2) Artificial intelligence and Law 113 (1993). 
this terminology was first introduced into science by h.L.A. hart, who, in particular, pointed out in his 
writings that any legal rule has an “open textuality,” i.e., on the one hand, no one-to-one interpretation 
of the legal norm can be given and, on the other hand, that in any system of law, gaps and a certain 
lack of regulation are inevitable. See История политических и правовых учений: Учебник [History 
of Political and Legal Doctrines: Textbook] 646 (M.N. Marchenko (ed.), Moscow: NOrMA, 2012).
106  Feteris & kloosterhuis 2009.
107  Alexy 1978.
108  Воробьев А.Г. Модель аргументации решений судов Федеративной Республики Германия [Anton 
G. vorobiev, Model of Argumentation of Decisions of the Courts of the Federal Republic of Germany] 
(Nov. 1, 2019), available at https://pravo.hse.ru/data/2012/10/21/1246188598/2003.%20%d0%94
%d0%Be%d0%BA%d0%BB%d0%B0%d0%B4.%20%d0%9C%d0%Be%d0%B4%d0%B5%d0%BB
%d1%8C%20%d0%B0%d1%80%d0%B3%d1%83%d0%BC%d0%B5%d0%Bd%d1%82%d0%B0%
d1%86%d0%B8%d0%B8%20%d1%80%d0%B5%d1%88%d0%B5%d0%Bd%d0%B8%d0%B9%20
%d1%81%d1%83%d0%B4%d0%Be%d0%B2%20%d0%A4%d0%A0%d0%93.doc.
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Arguments related to the second group are otherwise referred to as “interpretative 
arguments.”
One of the first to develop a list of their types was the italian scientist G. tarello, who 
in his book “the interpretation of Laws” identified 14 types of such arguments.109 this 
list was developed based on the italian tradition of law, but this categorization had 
a great influence outside italy, including the adoption of the well-known supporter 
of the rhetorical approach to the theory of argumentation C. Perelman.110
the list of types of arguments highlighted by the author has already been cited 
and described in detail in the literature on the theory of argumentation.111
As it is significant from the point of view of the practice of the bodies of constitu-
tional judicial control, it is necessary to mention the following arguments by name: 
the argument from the coherence of the legal regulation (excluding interpretation, 
putting two legal norms in a conflict situation),112 a psychological argument (justifying 
the interpretation of the norm by appealing to the initial will of the legislator, for 
example, based on the content of the travaux préparatoires), a teleological argument 
(justifying the application of the norm, based on the legal regulation established by 
it), an authoritative argument (justifying the need to apply the norm in the meaning 
that has already been given to it by the interpretation of the highest judicial authority 
or doctrine).113
109  tarello 1980.
110  Giovanni sartor et al., Argumentation Schemes for Statutory Interpretation: A Logical Analysis in 
Legal Knowledge and Information Systems – JURIX 2014: The Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference 11 
(r. hoekstra (ed.), Amsterdam: iOs Press, 2014).
111  Id.
112  in russian legal literature, such a technique is usually referred to as a technique of compositional 
interpretation. you can also talk about the rule of systemic interpretation or interpretation “in systemic 
unity” of the provisions of the Constitution, which exists in the practice of the Constitutional Court 
of the russian Federation. in particular, the Constitutional Court has repeatedly expressed a legal 
position, according to which all provisions of the Constitution of the russian Federation as a whole 
constitute a consistent systemic unity checking of any provision of the Constitution of the russian 
Federation for its compliance with other constitutional provisions is excluded. See, e.g., Постановление 
Конституционного Суда Российской Федерации от 19 апреля 2016 г. № 12-П «По делу о разрешении 
вопроса о возможности исполнения в соответствии с Конституцией Российской Федерации 
постановления Европейского Суда по правам человека от 4 июля 2013 года по делу «Анчугов 
и Гладков против России» в связи с запросом Министерства юстиции Российской Федерации» // 
Российская газета. 2016. № 95 [ruling of the Constitutional Court of the russian Federation No. 12-P 
of 19 April 2016. On the Case of the resolution of the issue of the Possibility of execution, in Accordance 
with the Constitution of the russian Federation, the decision of the european Court of human rights of 
4 July 2013 in the Case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia in Connection with a request of the Ministry 
of Justice of the russian Federation, rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2016, No. 95], para. 4. Cited by Шустров Д.Г. 
Материальные пределы изменения Конституции Российской Федерации // Конституционное 
и муниципальное право. 2018. № 7. С. 17–22 [dmitry G. shustrov, Substantial Limits of the Amendment 
of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 7 Constitutional and Municipal Law 17 (2018)].
113  As the most representative in terms of the use of this type of argument, it is possible to refer to the 
law-enforcement practice of the supreme Court of Canada. thus, in its decisions, the Court often not 
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subsequently, the system of interpretative arguments was systematized by 
d.N. MacCormick and r. summers, and there are 11 types of arguments (some of them 
coincide with those highlighted by G. tarello; some differ, for example, the argument 
of technical value).114
examples of the use of legal argumentation techniques, highlighted by G. tarello 
in theory as early as 1980 and systematized by d.N. MacCormick and r. summers can 
be found in the law enforcement practice of constitutional justice bodies around the 
world,115 which proves the possibility of using this theory when considering issues 
related to argumentation in constitutional judicial law enforcement practice.
it is possible to use the achievements of this theory in the study of constitutional 
identity as a legal argument. thus, if we analyze the decisions of the constitutional 
justice bodies in which this concept was used, it is possible to draw attention to the 
fact that the courts in their practice appealed to various interpretative arguments 
depending on the specifics of a particular case, and in some cases resorted 
immediately to a set of interpretative arguments.116
thus, for example, in formulating the doctrine of counter-limits, the italian Cons-
titutional Court, while justifying its decision, relied simultaneously on an argument by 
analogy, parsimony argument, an argument about general principles.
the Constitutional Court of Germany in the decision on the Maastricht Treaty 
case resorted to naturalistic and systemic arguments.
taking into account this circumstance, it seems possible to state the thesis that 
constitutional identity can be defined not just as a separate argumentation method, 
but as a complex argumentative scheme, including, as a rule, a set of different 
interpretative arguments.
relying on the meaningful concept of constitutional identity from the point of 
view of the theory of argumentation, constitutional identity can thus be defined as 
a set of interpretative arguments used by constitutional control bodies in justifying 
decisions within the framework in which an act is verified from the point of view of 
its compliance with national specifics of constitutional norms.
only refers to the legal positions previously expressed by it, which is characteristic of the practice of 
constitutional justice bodies around the world, but when justifying decisions, it also actively appeals 
to the explanations contained in the doctrine.
114  sartor et al. 2014.
115  From the point of view of the countries studied by the authors, the law enforcement practice of 
the supreme Court of Canada seems to be the most representative in terms of the use of possible 
methods of argumentation.
116  For example, in the aforementioned decision of the Constitutional Court of russia in the case of 
Anchugov and Gladkov, the Court, in justifying its position, consistently resorted to linguistic, historical 
and comparative legal arguments. ruling in english available at http://www.ksrf.ru/en/decision/
Judgments/documents/2016_April_19_12-P.pdf.
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Conclusion
to conclude, it is possible to note that constitutional identity is a multivocal 
notion. it can be defined as a set of constitutional provisions allows to determine 
a constitutional order of each individual state with all its internal legal characteristics. 
it also can be considered as a set of interpretative arguments, used in constitutional 
judicial practice.
regardless of the approach to the consideration of constitutional identity, it should 
be noted that this concept is a notion, emerged in constitutional judicial practice and 
for that reason is largely the result of interpretation of constitutional provisions by the 
constitutional control bodies.
the latter allows us to conclude that the specifics of the internal constitutional 
order are largely determined not only by the subject of the adoption of the constitution 
and the legislator, but also by the national constitutional review body.
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